SUGIYAMA Takashi

In the Fourth Grove of the Critical Forests and “On the Sense of Touch” (both written in 1769, published posthumously), Herder claims “sentio, ergo sum.” This paper aims to make clear what led Herder to this position, in order to consider the possibility of “sentio, ergo sum” as an alternative to the Cartesian “cogito, ergo sum.”

Sentio, ergo sum” in “On the Sense of Touch” is, on the one hand, said not only in terms of the “Molyneux’s problem,” but also from the view that it is the highest concept of philosophy to sense impenetrability of matter, by means of which the precritical Kant criticized the mind-body dualism and in response gave only a temporary answer “where I sense, there I am.” Herder rebutted this by the counterexample “spiritual impenetrability” and upgraded this “temporary” answer to the “highest concept of philosophy.” “Sentio, ergo sum” in the Fourth Grove of the Critical Forests is, on the other hand, the consequence of Herder’s formal criticism of Crusius, who criticized “cogito, ergo sum” be “conscius sum me cogitare, ergo sum.” “Being” was for Herder the unanalysable concept which can only be felt.