Jerrold Levinson insists that musical works are indicated type entities. The aim of this paper is, first, to summarize and clarify his view and, second, to examine his view and the criticisms directed towards Levinson’s notions of ‘indication’ and ‘creating types’. In section 1, I summarize why Levinson rejects ‘sound structure theory’. His motivations for rejecting it are two. First, he assumes that musical works can be created but that sound structure cannot. Second, he assumes that musical works must be individuated so finely that they can bear the aesthetic/artistic properties which we ordinarily attribute to them. In section 2, I explain his proposal that musical works are indicated type entities and ‘indicated type theory’ avoids problems which ‘sound structure theory’ cannot. In section 3, I examine two criticisms of Levinson’s view. The first criticism concerns the ontological nature of indicated type, a criticism that I think Levinson can answer reasonably. The second criticism concerns his notion of ‘creating new type’, which is a genuine problem for Levinson.
Keywords: ontology of music, ontology of artefact, indicated type, Jerrold Levinson, qua-object